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WHO SPEAKS FOR THE STATE?: RELIGIOUS SPEAKERS ON
GOVERNMENT PLATFORMS AND THE ROLE OF
DISCLAIMING ENDORSEMENT
Steven H. Aden, Esq.*
The recent Supreme Court decision in Santa Fe Independent School District
v. Doe prohibits prayer at school-sponsored events. In this Article the author
analyzes the development of Supreme Courtjurisprudence in the area of religion
in public schools. Noting the tension between the Establishment and Free Speech
Clauses, the author proposes the use of disclaimers to allow student expression
at school events to avoid violating the Establishment Clause.
INTRODUCrmON
In the Supreme Court's decision this term in Santa Fe Independent School
District v. Doe,' the Court at last made it clear-for now-that its decision in
Lee v. Weisman2 was not about prayer by members of the clergy, or prayer
"sponsored by" public school officials, or even about prayer at graduation
ceremonies. Rather, the plurality's decision, as the Santa Fe majority interprets
it, was intended to erect a constitutional barrier against organized prayer at
school events generally. It now seems clear that after Santa Fe, virtually no
policy or practice that, either on its face or as applied, permits prayer at school-
sponsored events or fosters an environment in which prayer would be the
reasonably foreseeable result, can pass constitutional muster with this Court.
After Santa Fe, prayer in public schools will be relegated to the private
spheres of personal belief and group association, where purely voluntary,
student-initiated prayer outside of instructional periods remains as fully
protected as other forms of non-religious speech and peaceful assembly.' It is
* Chief Litigation Counsel, The Rutherford Institute. The author would like to
acknowledge the able assistance of Michael Casey Mattox, Boston College Law School
(J.D. expected, 2001). Copyright to this work is held by the author and The Rutherford
Institute (2000).
1 530 U.S. _, 120 S. Ct. 2266 (2000).
2 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
' See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995)
("[P]rivate religious speech, far from being a First Amendment orphan, is as fully protected
under the Free Speech Clause as secular private expression."); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
263,269 (1981) ("[Religious worship and discussion] are forms of speech and association
protected by the First Amendment."). Widmar upheld the provision of public university
meeting facilities to a student religious group for the purpose of "prayer, hymns, Bible
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elementary and fundamental that the freedom to believe is sacrosanct,4 and the
freedom to profess belief is subject to no governmental regulation other than
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, which in the public school
context chiefly relates to instructional time.' Voluntary, student-initiated
activities such as the annual "See You at the Pole" event, non-curricular related
Bible clubs, and the distribution of religious literature during non-instructional
time to willing recipients (at least at the secondary school age levels),6 remain
forms of fully protected speech and association..
The Establishment Clause acts as a structural constraint on the power of
government to promote or engage in religious activity.7 Where the impetus for
religious activity is purely of private initiative and design, there is no state action
and the Establishment Clause does not proscribe the conduct This is true even
if there is government assistance, so long as the criteria for receiving that
assistance is neutral with respect to religion.9 Nonetheless, after Lee and Santa
commentary, and discussion of religious views and experiences." Id. at 265 n.2.
" See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,303 (1940) ("[T]he Amendment embraces
two concepts,-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute.").
' The Court acknowledged in Santa Fe, "nothing in the Constitution as interpreted by
this Court prohibits any public school student from voluntarily praying at any time before,
during, or after the schoolday." 530 U.S. at_, 120 S. Ct. at 2281.
6 The Seventh Circuit cautiously held that religious speech is appropriate for elementary
level students. See Muller by Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1538-39
(7th Cir. 1996). Also, it vigorously asserted the rights of junior high students to engage in
religious expression at school. See Hedges v. Wauconda Cmty. Sch. Dist., 9 F.3d 1295,
1298-1300 (7th Cir. 1993).
' See Carl H. Esbeck, Differentiating the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, 42
J. CHURCH & ST. 311, 311 (2000).
' See Capital Square Review, 515 U.S. at 760.
9 In recent decisions, the Court has substantially resolved the confusion over the
constitutional status of indirect aid to sectarian activities by articulating a rule that aid to
sectarian interests is permissible as long as the aid is provided under religiously neutral
funding criteria. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. _, 120 S.Ct. 2530, 2544 (2000);
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234-35 (1997); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist.,
509 U.S. 1, 10 (1993); Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,487
(1986). This rule, however, is simply an alternative formulation of the state action test. So
long as the funding conditions are religiously neutral, and the decision to commit the funds
to sectarian education is made by private individuals and not the state, the Establishment
Clause is not implicated. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at __, 120 S. Ct. at 2544; Agostini, 521
U.S. at 226; Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10; Witters, 474 U.S. at 487. The Court in Agostini pointed
out that the common thread running through the funding cases was that "any money that
ultimately went to religious institutions did so 'only as a result of the genuinely independent
and private choices of' individuals." 521 U.S. at 226 (quoting Witters, 474 U.S. at 487). The
funding program's neutral eligibility criteria ensured that the religious use of the funds "was
a 'result of the private decision of individual parents' and '[could not] be attributed to state
decisionmaking."' Id. (quoting Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10); see also Mitchell, 530 U.S. at _,
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Fe, 'compelling First Amendment questions remain over the constitutional status
of public professions of personal faith., For example, may a high school
Valedictorian speak about the importance of his religious faith to his success
during his valedictory address? May the same student invite the audience to
convert to his faith? Perhaps -more importantly, may a school exercise prior
restraint by censoring these students' speeches because of the religious nature of
their messages; out of fears that they may be subjecting a "captive audience" to a
"religious exercise?"'" An analysis of the Court's past holdings and current
trends in the. First Amendment's free speech and religion clause jurisprudence
suggests that religious students may not, in fact, be censored by school
authorities solely because of their religious viewpoints. This brief Article will
attempt to set out an introduction to the issues and applicable First Amendment
law, and provide a proposed framework for understanding and accommodating
the right of expression of religious public school students without. compromising
the important interest of church-state separation.
I. FROM TINKER TO ROSENBERGER
It is well established that student speech is protected by the First
Amendment. As the Supreme Court put it in an often-quoted, but infrequently
examined, maxim in Tinker v. Des Moines, "[i]t can hardly be argued that either
students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate."" The essence of Tinker was its holding that
students' freedom of speech, and other fundamental freedoms such as free.
exercise of religion and freedom of association, may not ordinarily be subjected
to infringement by school authorities without evidence that would reasonably
lead officials to fear a substantial disruption in the educational process.' Bethel
School District No. 403 v. Fraser3 began the process of defining cabining
strictures to this broad proposition by recognizing a school's right to sanction
lewd and indecent speech.' 4 Fraser involved a sexually explicit speech given by
120 S. Ct. at 2544 (discussing the lack of government support for religion where neutral aid
is available); cf Peck v. Upshur County Bd. of Educ., 155 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding
no state action leading to endorsement problem where school officials merely permitted
private individuals on a viewpoint-neutral basis to place Bibles on school property).
' Compare Cole v. Oroville Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that
review and control of religious content of valedictorian's graduation speech was necessary
to avoid Establishment Clause violation), with Chandler v. Siegelman, 230 F.3d 1313 (2000)
(reinstating upon remand from Supreme Court earlier decision vacating injunction that could
have effect of chilling private student religious expression in public schools).
" Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
2 Seeid. at513.
13 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
'4 See id. at 680.
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a high school student in support of a friend's candidacy for student office.'"
Although the speech could not be said to have caused an imminent substantial
disruption in the educational function of the school, it could be sanctioned
nonetheless.' As the Court clarified subsequently in Hazelwood School District
v. Kuhlmeier, "[t]he decision in Fraser rested on the 'vulgar,' 'lewd,' and
'plainly offensive' character of a speech... rather than on any propensity of the
speech to 'materially disrup[t] classwork or involv[e] substantial disorder or
invasion of the rights of others."" 7  In the Fraser Court's view, the speech
involved was near the outer periphery of First Amendment protection and
inappropriate to a public school audience."'
In Hazelwood, a journalism class produced the high school student paper.' 9
The case arose after a principal eliminated stories dealing with sexual activity
inappropriate for some of the younger students at school.20 The very nature of
the activity in question was such that members of the public might reasonably
perceive it to bear the imprimatur of the school because "[t]hese activities may
fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum, . . . as they are
supervised by faculty members and designed to impart particular knowledge or
skills to student participants and audiences."'" Hazelwood, however, did not
sanction viewpoint discrimination; rather, it involved subject matter that was
inappropriate for certain ages or that would violate the privacy rights of students
or parents. In Hazelwood, the Supreme Court declared that a school must
tolerate "a student's personal expression that happens to occur on school
premises."22 However, it may restrict "material that may be inappropriate for
their level of maturity."2
3
In Board of Education of the Westside Community Schools v. Mergens,24 the
Court held that a public school does not unconstitutionally endorse religion by
permitting a religious club to meet on school grounds and recruit members
through the school's newspaper, bulletin boards, public address system, and
annual club fair.' The Court emphasized that "there is a crucial difference
between government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause
11 See id. at 677.
16 See id at 683.
'7 484 U.S. 260, 271-72 n.4 (1988) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513).
1 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 688 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)).
19 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 262.
20 See id. at 263.
21 Id. at 271.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
25 See id. at 247-53 (affirming the constitutionality of the Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C.
§§ 4071-74, which grants religious clubs the same privileges as those of other non-curricular
student organizations).
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forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free
Exercise Clauses protect."26 The Court reasoned: "We think that secondary
school students are mature enough and are likely to understand that a school
does not endorse or support student speech that it merely permits on a
nondiscriminatory basis . . . . The proposition that schools do not endorse
everything they fail to censor is not complicated."2 The Mergens Court thus
acknowledged that secondary school students are mature enough not to attribute
official school endorsement to student religious groups merely because the
school permits the groups to meet and to enjoy the privilege of disseminating
information about their group.2
This distinction between private religious speech and government action
endorsing religion was also critical to the Supreme Court's rationale in Lee v.
Weisman.29 In Lee, the principal of a public school invited a local member of the
clergy, a Jewish rabbi, to give "nonsectarian" prayers and provided the rabbi
with guidelines as to the content of the prayers.3 A student challenged the
legality of these prayers on Establishment Clause grounds." While no particular
Establishment Clause approach garnered a majority, the Court's plurality held
that when a public school official invites a member of the clergy to deliver a
graduation prayer, and when the official advises the member of the clergy on
how to deliver that prayer, the Establishment Clause is violated.3 2
The plurality emphasized that the crucial factor in determining whether
coercion exists in a prayer case is whether state officials have directed the
"performance of a formal religious exercise."33 Justice Kennedy reasoned:
26 Id. at 250; cf Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 841 (1995)
("'[T]he government has not fostered or encouraged' any mistaken impression that the
student newspapers speak for the University.") (quoting Capitol Square Review & Advisory
Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 766 (1995)).
27 Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250.
2s See id In Hedges v. Wauconda Cmty. Union Sch. Dist., 9 F.3d 1295 (7th Cir. 1993),
the court stated:
[I]gnorant bystanders cannot make censorship legitimate .... Schools may
explain that they do not endorse speech by permitting it. If pupils do not
comprehend so simple a lesson, then one wonders whether... schools can teach
anything at all. Free speech, free exercise, and the ban on establishment are
quite compatible when the government remains neutral and educates the public
about the reasons.
Id. at 1299-1300.
29 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
30 Id. at 581.
3' See id at 584.
32 See id at 597.
33 Id. at 586.
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[T]he school district's supervision and control of a high school
graduation ceremony places public pressure, as well as peer pressure,
on attending students to stand as a group or, at least, maintain
respectful silence during the invocation and benediction. This
pressure, though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt
compulsion.34
Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion in Lee turned on four factors. First, the
case involved a public school.35 Second, school officials and teachers were
active in planning the graduation ceremony, inviting a person to offer graduation
prayers, and advising the clergy member on the content of his prayers. 6 Third, a
local member of the clergy offered the graduation prayers." Fourth, the case
involved a graduation ceremony that graduates and their families might have felt
an obligation to attend, even though their attendance was not mandatory.3
I. SANTA FE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT V. DOE
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Santa Fe Independent School
District v. Doe to clarify an issue that had remained unclear in the circuit courts
of appeal after Lee v. Weisman: "[Whether Santa Fe's] policy permitting
student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games violates the Establishment
Clause."39  After Lee, Santa Fe had adopted a policy permitting an elected
student -council chaplain to deliver a prayer over the public address system
before each football game.4" Mormon and Catholic parents challenged the policy
as a violation of the Establishment Clause.4 While the case was pending, Santa
Fe adopted a policy that permitted, but did not require, prayer initiated and led
by students at games. 2 The district court ordered the policy modified to permit
only nonsectarian, nonproselytizing prayer, in accordance with the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Jones v. Clear Creek 1143 The text of the prayer was to be
34 Id. at 593.
11 See id. at 581.
36 See id.
37 See id
38 See id. at 595.
"' Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. __,120 S. Ct. 2266, 2269 (2000).
'o See id at 2291. Justice Stevens stressed the historical context of the Santa Fe policy
as an attempt to circumvent Lee, noting, "[tihis case comes to us as the latest step in
developing litigation brought as a challenge to institutional practices that unquestionably
violated the Establishment Clause." Id. at 2282.
41 See id. at 2271.
42 See id
"' See id.; see also Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 508 U.S. 967 (1993).
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determined by students without input from school officials." The order
permitted references to specific religious figures, so long as the general thrust
was "nonproselytizing." '45 In response, Santa Fe enacted a graduation policy
permitting the senior class to vote by secret ballot to choose whether to have an
invocation.' If they so chose, a separate vote would be held to elect the student
who would give it.4 The policy was subsequently extended to govern football
game prayers."' The final policy, which became known as the "October policy,"
omitted the reference to "prayer" and referred instead to "statements" and
"messages" as well as "invocations. ' ' 9 The district court enjoined the first,
open-ended policy, but permitted the October policy as restricted to
"nonsectarian and nonproselytizing" prayer." On review, the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed. It noted that while its decision in Jones had permitted a
similar voting arrangement for nonsectarian, nonproselytizing -prayer at
graduation ceremonies, it had restricted the rationale of the case to graduation, a
"once in-a-lifetime event" which appropriately called for "solemnization."'
The Court stated that, although Santa Fe involved student led prayers and a
different type of school function, it was guided by the principles of Lee v.
Weisman.52  Justice Stevens, writing for the 6-3 majority, first rejected the
argument that the pre-game invocations could be deemed "private speech." 3
While not every message given in such a setting is the government's own, the
Court said, it distinguished Rosenberger and the limited forum cases. Forum
analysis was held inapplicable because the school district did not open the
asserted forum to indiscriminate use, but only allowed one student (the same
student for the whole season) to give the invocation.54 The message was also
restricted as to the content and the topic because the "majoritarian process
implemented by [Santa Fe] District guarantees, by definition, that minority
candidates will never prevail and that their views will be effectively silenced."5
44 Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at ___ 120 S. Ct. at 2271.
41 Id. at 2272.
' See id.
47 See id.
48 See id. at 2273.
49 id.
50 Id at 2272-73.
", Id. at 2274 (quoting Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402, 406-07 (5th
Cir. 1995)).
52 See id. at 2269.
11 Id. at 2287.
14 See id at 2275-76.
" Id. at 2269. This Article assumes that the constitutional status of private religious
speech in a public school sponsored forum is not altered by the nature of the forum.
Certainly, a student's First Amendment rights are even more clearly protected where a
school has created a limited open forum. Unlike the systematized student prayer struck down
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The Court also cited its perception that "the District has failed to divorce
itself from the invocations' religious content" by implementing the voting
process.36 "[A]s we found in Lee, the 'degree of school involvement' makes it
clear that the pregame prayers bear 'the imprint of the state and thus put school-
age children who objected in an untenable position.""' Other language in the
policy stated the prayer "shall" be conducted by the student council "with advice
and consent" of the principal. The "statement or invocation" was to be
"consistent with the goals and purposes of this policy," which were "to
solemnize the event, to promote good sportsmanship and student safety, and to
establish the appropriate environment for the competition."" The Court found
that the policy actually "invites and encourages religious messages" because the
stated purpose is "to solemnize the event," and a religious message is the most
obvious way to do this. 9
The Court noted that an "invocation," which it defined as "an appeal for
divine assistance," was the only type of message specifically approved in the
policy.' The Court also reasoned that the Santa Fe policy created an
endorsement of religion because the student prayer was delivered at a school-
sponsored function on school property, surrounded with the insignia, symbols,
and colors of the school. In this context, the audience "must perceive" the
message as "delivered with the approval of the school administration.""'  The
Court thus decided that the objective observer would "unquestionably perceive
the inevitable pregame prayer as stamped with her school's seal of approval."6
Justice Stevens concluded that "the use of an invocation to foster such solemnity
in Santa Fe, graduation ceremonies and other school assemblies frequently involve student
speech on various subjects, often without prior review and approval of the speech by school
officials. In these circumstances, a limited open forum has been created and the state may
only justify its censorship or editing of student speech if it has a "compelling state interest."
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,45 (1983). However, even
if a school assembly may be considered a nonpublic forum, viewpoint discrimination is not
permitted. See generally Comelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
804 (1985) ("Although a speaker may be excluded from a nonpublic forum . . . the
government violates the First Amendment when it denies access to a speaker solely to
suppress the point of view he espouses on an otherwise includible subject."). A school may
still only place restrictions on speech that are "reasonable and not an effort to suppress
expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view." Perry, 460 U.S. at
46.
56 Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at, ,120 S. Ct. at 2269.
I d. at 2277 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590 (1992)).
8 d. at 2273 n.6.
I d. at 2277.
60 Id. at 2269.61 Id. at 2278.
62 Id.
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is impermissible when, in actuality, it constitutes prayer sponsored by the school
[a]nd it is unclear what type of message would be both appropriately
'solemnizing' ... and yet non-religious. 6 3
III. THE STATUS OF RELIGIOUS SPEECH AFTER SANTA FE
Taken together, the Court's public school free speech cases-Tinker, Fraser,
and Hazelwood-suggest that public school authorities may certainly review a
proposed student expression for any content that can fairly be said to be subject
to correction or censorship for legitimate pedagogical reasons. Spoken words,
like written works, may be reviewed for grammar, style, punctuation or the like,
if the presentation may be characterized as furthering the school's curriculum.
Certainly, content that falls outside the scope of the purpose for the presentation
may be struck, or the student directed to remain on topic.
Likewise, speech may be excised of content that is patently offensive, age-
inappropriate, or slanderous. Speech that could foreseeably incite disruption or
create an impediment to the learning process may also be. proscribed. These
strictures ought to offer administrators more than sufficient authority for
reviewing and tailoring student presentations in ways that avoid material
disruption or gross offense. Where, however, public school officials determine
to monitor and control religious references in a student presentation, whether out
of Establishment Clause concerns or out of fear of permitting offense, they cross
a line forbidden by the First Amendment. As the Supreme Court has made clear,
for the devout individual, religion is not a discrete category or a form of
"content;" it is a viewpoint that pervades that person's outlook and informs
virtually every aspect of his or her being." Any restriction on a religious
viewpoint must accordingly be justified by a showing that a compelling state
interest is at stake, and the means chosen by the school are the least restrictive of
speech.6'
With regard to student-initiated graduation presentations, school districts
have three alternative courses of action. First, they may refrain from monitoring
and censoring presentations at all, i.e., engage in no review whatsoever for
content. Although constitutionally permissible, the First Amendment does not
require this course. It is undoubtedly the least practical of alternatives, raising
numerous unnecessary problems; for example, how should school officials
respond if one student attempts to lead the assembly in prayer, or another
chooses to "solemnize" the occasion by reciting Marilyn Manson lyrics or
63 Id. at 2279.
4 See generally Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (finding
viewpoint discrimination of student-run Christian newspaper).
65 See id. (disallowing scarcity of funds as reason for discrimination).
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similar offensive creeds? Second, administrators could monitor and correct for
inappropriate content only, in a viewpoint-neutral fashion, as dicussed above.
This also is a constitutionally-permissible course, and the one that seems least
intrusive. Third, administrators could monitor and censor for improperly
"religious" content, which generally breaks down into two subordinate concerns:
whether religious expressions are sufficiently "nonsectarian" to avoid causing
offense, and whether they remain "non-proselytizing." Of the three policy
alternatives, the latter is easily the most constitutionally offensive for several
important reasons.
First, this course requires government actors to enter the constitutionally
prohibited realm of delineating the- degree of religious content that will be
deemed acceptable and inoffensive to the audience. The term "nonsectarian," in
a less pluralistic age, once referred to generic Christian doctrine, as expressed,
for example, in the Apostles' Creed, and as opposed to doctrinal distinctions
between Roman Catholicism and Protestant sects. Today, in a society in which
urban public schools may include large numbers of Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim,
Jewish, and Sikh students, as well as practitioners of fetishistic and animistic
religions, atheists and agnostics, the term "nonsectarian" has become
meaningless. Because of this rich diversity, virtually any expression of sincere
religious devotion in the public sphere is likely to cause offense to some. On the
other hand, this diversity also militates against the likelihood that a particular
student's permitted expression might be taken as a state endorsement of his or
her faith.
Furthermore, "nonsectarian" , is simply a proxy for "non-offensive." That
some could be offended has never been the basis for a constitutional proscription
on speech, either outside the public school context or within it,' nor for religious
speech.6" Offense to religious speech has nothing to do with the Establishment
Clause problem or apparent endorsement of religion.
Second, the course of censorship for religious content requires the
government to enmesh itself in the hopeless task of determining whether speech
' See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding state's prosecution of flag
burner unconstitutional); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (finding state statute for
disturbing the peace unconstitutional); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)
(discussing a "clear and present danger" test for polemic political speech).
67 See, e.g., Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 510 U.S. 1307 (1993)
(discussing cross erected by the Ku Klux Klan); Board of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v.
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (discussing access of Christian club to school); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (discussing sale of materials by Jehovah's Witnesses).
Confirming this view in the present context, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority in Lee
v. Weisman, stated, "We do not hold that every state action implicating religion is invalid if
one or a few citizens find it offensive. People may take offense at all manner of religious
as well as nonreligious messages, but offense alone does not in every case show a violation."
505 U.S. 577, 597 (1992).
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is unduly "proselytizing," i.e., whether it has the effect of persuading others to its
position. This kind of invasive parsing of religion has been consistently and
vigorously opposed by the Supreme Court as a dangerous form of excessive
entanglement with religion." "[S]crutiniz[ing] the content of student speech,
lest [it] ...contain too great a religious content" violates the Establishment
Clause.69 In Lee, rejecting the school district's defense that the rabbi's prayer
was "nonsectarian," Justice Kennedy opined that the First Amendment does not
permit the government to undertake the drafting of such "non-sectarian"
prayers.70 As the Court has said in another context, "Courts should not
undertake to dissect religious beliefs."'"
A policy of censoring religious graduation speeches strikes at the heart of the
principles that animate the First Amendment prohibition on viewpoint
discrimination. A valedictorian earns the right to speak by completely objective
criteria, based on academic merit; he or she is, quite literally, chosen by
computer according to grade point average.' A valedictory speech on the topic
of how to succeed, or how that particular student succeeded, is intended to
persuade by personal example and exhortation. A valedictorian speaks to the
public as an example to be followed; the speaker's habits and attitudes are
examined closely as a model to copy, by students for their personal success and
68 See e.g., Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (adhering to
a recognized form or denomination of religion not required for Free Exercise protection);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602(1971) (discussing three-part test for cases involving the
Establishment Clause); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (holding that religion
recognized by Free Exercise Clause need not be theistic, but only a view of universal
meaning that takes the place of God in one's life).
69 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 844.
70 Lee, 505 U.S. at 589.
7'1 Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981)
(discussing employee terminated because the production of war materials violated his
religious beliefs); see also Rouser v. White, 944 F. Supp. 1447, 1454 (E.D. Cal. 1996)
("Abjuring inquiry into whether the orthodox interpretation of areligion requires aparticular
practice, as contrasted with the subjective understanding of the plaintiff as to his religious
needs, is required by virtue of the fact that '[c]ourts are not arbiters of scriptural
interpretation."') (quoting Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716).
72 Selection by grade point average altogether avoids the majoritarian concerns expressed
by the Court in Santa Fe, supra Part II, and Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. v. Southworth,
529 U.S. 217 (2000). Except in cases in which multiple valedictory candidates may be
eligible to speak, as where several students have attained the highest G.P.A., and the "tie-
breaker" is subjective, the selection of a valedictory speaker is typically not subject to
majoritarian constraints. In a concurring opinion in Lee v. Weisman, Justice Souter, joined
by Justices O'Connor and Stevens, wrote, "If the state had chosen its graduation day speaker
according to a wholly secular criteria, and if one of those speakers (not a state actor) had
individually chosen to deliver a religious message, it would have been harder to attribute an
endorsement of religion to the State." 505 U.S. at 630 n.8 (Souter, J., concurring).
2001]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
by parents as an ideal to instill in their own children. To order, for example, a
Christian valedictorian to attribute his success to anything or anyone but his
personal faith in God, is to negate the essence of who he is as a person. It is
discrimination, pure and simple, as it clearly communicates to him that he is a
second-class citizen whose views, alone among those of his peers, are not to be
aired publicly."
Nor does suppression of this sort promote diversity. By conveying a
message of bias and disregard for the personal convictions of others, this type of
policy contravenes the pedagogical interest in encouraging the exploration of
ideas. Under such a policy, when an atheist or agnostic student held the
microphone she would be free to express herself consistently with her
convictions, but a religious student would be required to forego the opportunity
to speak or else not to relate their own convictions. Such a double standard
would impose a state hostility to religion, which the Court has frequently warned
against. As the Court cautioned in Rosenberger, "official censorship would be
far more inconsistent with the Establishment Clause's dictates than would
governmental provision of secular printing services on a religion-blind basis."74
IV. THE ROLE OF DISCLAIMING ENDORSEMENT IN NEGOTIATING CONFLICTS
BETWEEN THE ESTABLISHMENT AND FREE SPEECH CLAUSES
In its recent session, the Supreme Court reiterated its view that prior
restraints based upon the content of speech must serve a compelling state interest
by the least restrictive means." A number of free speech cases have discussed
the efficacy of private or government disclaimers to save a religious expression
from the appearance of endorsement, chief among them Capitol Square Review
and Advisory Board v. Pinette.76 Many of the cases regarding religious holiday
"' A third reason is inherent in the first two: the state "cannot vest restraining control
over the right to speak on religious subjects in an administrative official where there are no
appropriate standards to guide his action." Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 295 (1951).
Regulation of the freedom of speech is allowed only "with narrow specificity." NAACP v.
Buttons, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). Censoring "proselytizing," "sectarian speech," or
"denominational speech" is intrinsically "lacking in 'terms susceptible of objective
management."' Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589,
604 (1967) (quoting Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 286 (1961)); see also
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
74 Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845 (1995); see also Chandler
v. James, 180 F.3d 1254, 1261 (11th Cir. 1999), reh'g denied, 198 F.3d 265 (11th Cir.
1999), cert. granted judgment vacated by Chandler v. Siegelman, 120 S. Ct. 2714 (2000)
("'Cleansing' [the schools] of all religious expression . . . . inevitably results in
'establishment' of disbelief... [T]he Constitution requires neutrality.").
71 See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
76 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
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displays on public property also discuss the presence or absence of a disclaimer
as a factor in determining whether a reasonable observer would perceive
religious endorsement." Implicit in the view of the Justices who have promoted
the use of disclaimers is the notion that where the speech or display is private,
but is on public property and may be perceived as governmental endorsement, a
disclaimer of governmental involvement may be a less restrictive means of
avoiding an Establishment Clause violation than a prior governmental restraint.
If the existence of an endorsement concern is a real one, and the question of
governmental sponsorship of religious speech is at least ambiguous under the
circumstances, then the state may indeed be obligated to take steps to obviate the
concern. If the state has two real alternatives, one of which is to exercise prior
restraint by review and censorship, and the other is to disclaim endorsement, it
would seem obvious that the latter is the less restrictive means of furthering that
important governmental end.
For example, an announcement such as this one could be made before all
student presentations at graduation ceremonies: "The students have been given
the platform this evening for personal expressions. While the school district has
given advice on content and style where it was sought, we wish to make it clear
that the students are speaking on their own behalf, and not on behalf of the
school or its administration." This would make explicit what should already be
implicitly understood. The Court's statement in Santa Fe that the school district
had failed to disassociate itself from the religious content in the invocations by
implementing a student voting process implies that there may be alternative
means of disassociation that might prove satisfactory to the Court." While the
presence of a disclaimer will not necessarily save the constitutionality of all
forms of religious expression on public property,79 it is certainly a means that
should be employed before the constitutional last resort of a prior restraint is
imposed.
77 E.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668 (1984).
78 Cf Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 270 (1990)
(Brennan, J. and Marshall, J., concurring). The concurrence stated:
[Westside] must fully disassociate itself from the [Christian] club's religious
speech and avoid appearing to sponsor or endorse the club's goals. It could, for
example, entirely discontinue encouraging student participation in clubs and
clarify that the clubs are not instrumentally related to the school's overall
mission. Or, if [Westside] sought to continue its general endorsement of those
clubs that did not engage in controversial speech, it could do so if it also
affirmatively disclaimed any endorsement of the Christian club.
id.
'9 See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (holding the presence of a disclaimer
of endorsement on the Ten Commandments display was insufficient).
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